TO : Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Urban Area Studies Program

PROBLEM:

1. To provide urban area information required for DD/P opensational needs (tab "A") /and to fill a serious gap in our intelligence on the Soviet Bloc /.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- 2. Late in 1953, DD/P requested CRR/Geographic Research for a to provide urban studies for operational purposes. An immediate attempt was made to define the request and construct an outline of the proposed study. This required a number of months of coordination with all interested units of DD/P. A recombasis of its meet for urban information was made in a memorandum, dated 26 October 1954, from Chief, Operations, DD/P to DD/I. (tab "B")
- 3. Inquiry was made through the NIS Committee to determine capabilities of the IAC agencies to incorporate the DD/P requirements into the production of Supplement IV, NIS, the main responsibility for which rested with the Army. The Army reported informally in June, 1954, that it lacked the capability to produce the unbecarear research as required under Supplement IV, NIS, let alone the additional requirements of a kindred sort as outlined by DD/P. To further ascertain a more positive position of the Department of Army with regard to its urban area research responsibilities, G-2 were asked to submit an informal estimate of costs required to undertake the DD/P program. The estimate was received in January, 1955, and is attached as tab "C".
- 4. Shortly after the determination of lack of Army capabilities for NIS Supplement IV production and other urban area research, as investigation was made of the production facilities of the Air Research Division, Library of Congress for estimating their capability for undertaking the DD/P program. This division, under contract with the Air Force, has for the last six years been producing target analysis studies, about 30 percent of which are useable in their present format by CIA and which could be modified and expanded to meet CIA's specific requirements. Any expansion or modification, however, would require a sizeable augmentation of the staff of ARD and would essentially constitute a performance of the work under

excernal research contract. Space is an extremely critical factor. In addition, we have been informed that Congress has become increasingly critical of Library of Congress projects on behalf of the agencies of the government. The informal estimate secured from the All Force is attached as tab "D".

- 5. In the meantime, the Geographic Area has undertaken to make the most urgent requirements of the DD/P for detailed urban area plans. This limited production of five studies has only been possible by a radical adjustment of priority work with some sacrifics on the part of DD/P and other consumers for other urgently nached studies.
- 6. Both the Air Force and Army estimates seem to be based on the assumption that the entire total of 300 cities at the rate of 300 per year can be accomplished, maintaining standards of quality and meeting all DD/P requirements without regard to the availability of existing information, plans, and photographs. The Geographic Arms estimates that a careful plan satisfying DD/P needs is only possible for approximately 50 percent of the 300 cities and that even for that 50 percent there will likely continue to be significant gain intelligence coverage.

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- 7. The costs of \$485,000 and \$500,000 estimated by the Air Force and Army respectively, appear to be excessive in terms of establishing a production facility in tune with availability of intelligence. This is understandable because any agency engaging in a contract or accepting funds on a reimburseable basis must define the perimeter of its work in terms of people, money, and manders of end products. This is not to say that neither agency considered the availability of intelligence and its effect upon accord production.
- 8. Rather than be forced to launch a tremendous effort in terms of personnel and funds by either external research or reimbursement, it seems appropriate and expedient to examine the feasibility of stablishing an urban area facility within CIA to take care of these Agency's continuing need for urban area data. It seems fairly obvious that much of the covert work of the Agency must of necessity be conducted in urban centers where there are concentrations of industry, power, transportation, communication facilities, civil

and military control, all of which demand accurate detailed debt on urban complexes which are or become target areas. Immediate availaability of an expert facility, no matter how small, to mest the priority needs of the Agency for data on cities in support of agency tions would be a tremendous asset. As field operations develop, the production facility could respond under full security control to rapidly changing requirements. A program of the magnitude of the included in the DD/P request (approximately 300 selected cities) would require six years for completion in a facility with a T/O of approximately fifty. There is some question as to whether a program of this size should be launched without a period of experimentation and shake-down in terms of actual DD/P needs. Furthermore, it can be anticipated that the requirements of this Agency will not be satisfied in six years. It could be assumed that the very nature of the CIA mission will require continuing urban area study and that it would be to our advantage to have an internally controlled flexible production facility.

- 9. The cost of establishing and maintaining a facility in CIA would be considerably less. It is estimated that a program could be operative and satisfy most standard requirements of 50 studies per year for approximately \$400,000 samually. Even the expenditure of this amount, although less than the estimates from the Air Force and Army, could assure maximum value from money spent if a period of experimentation at a lesser rate were undertaken. Even though we have developed with DD/P a statement of current Toquirements, it may take the complete processing of a number of unban wee studies and their use by DD/P before we jointly arrive at an exceptable final product for their operational needs. This period of experimentation which will require painstaking effort to fully apply research capabilities to specific operation requirements and the to free discussion necessary to overcome problems can best be done within CIA rather than through liaison with an external research contractor.
- of quality can be an inherent part of the operation and would not be dependent upon uncontrollable factors as in a contract relationship. But only could the content and quality of the finished using area study be specifically tailored for CIA needs but also the west accumulation of detailed data would be immediately available for use in meeting other requirements by virtue of the fact that the urban area is not an entity unto itself but a part of regional complex.

- 11. The establishment of a facility in CIA would provide a reservoir of professional talent and would round out Agency competence in subject disciplines covering the Soviet Bloc. The final urban area studies produced in CIA could be more readily or certainly as easily adapted to meet other intelligence agency's needs as any product produced under contract outside CIA.
- 12. Certain types of material held in DD/P files are currently being made available to us for the limited urban area work now in process. It is believed that access to working files would be desired an outside agency.
- 13. It would appear that the Department of Army has an assignment of responsibility for urban area work in view of its responsible bility for the production of MIS Supplement IV. This is only partially true in that the DD/P requirements are greater in scope in certain regards and not identic in terms of the areas involved. The relationship between the proposed DD/P Urban Area Progress and the HIS Supplement IV has been thoroughly explored. The Army was, informally through G-2 and the Army Map Service, made swere of CIA interests and requirements for urban area studies in 1953 and again in 1954. Their response at all times has been conditioned by the facts of government life. namely restrictions on personnel slots, budget, and programs of bigher priority and of more concern to the Army itself rather than to the intelligence community as a whole. The Army has not only allowed the MIS Supplement IV Progress to remain dorsent to date, but also has not allocated money or staff to MIS Supplement IV work during FY-55 and noiallottment of funds has been made for FY-56. At the earliest, production could get underway in FY-57 only if it were provided for in current budget requests and as a token preliminary effort. As earlier start might possibly be made if funds already available and planned for other programs were to be reallocated for use for Mill Supplement IV work. This could conceivably move the time schedule forward by some months. At present there are no indications that this will be done. Informally, we have been told that there is state question of the practicability of producing the HIS Supplement IV as it is presently outlined and planned. The question resolves itself into one of deciding whether the goal to be achieved is worth the expenditure of effort and money in terms of potential or actual was of the final product. Something less comprehensive in scope, not so all inclusive of every detail of the urban area could, it is thought, be satisfactory for anticipated end uses. Even such a reduced approach does not have the support required for actual production. The lack of activity on urban area work by the Army seems to be achated to a number of factors beyond the control of the Army Map Service

which has the production responsibility for RIS SupplementIV. effective ceiling on personnel slots has directed work on only woose programs which in one way or another have been given high priority. Urban area work on the Soviet Bloc, regardless of its MIS status; is not high enough on the Army list of requirements, as that related to military planning, to warrant effort at this time or in the farsecable future. It appears that an outside stimulus of some secation tude, including money, would be required to artificially change Army attitudes and approach to urban area work. We feel that the \$500,000 estimate by the Army is more than should be paid to change the position of the Army and to stimulate a reconsideration of the responsibilities and the priority accorded to them. Whether the Army might be induced to seriously undertake urban area productiva by a formal indication of interest by CIA is, of course, not known but such is doubted. As a practical matter, gearing CIA's geographic research along lines proposed in this paper would be technically more practical than for comparable expansions in the Army. It is, of course, possible for the Agency to provide the funds to G-2 for this purpose.

CONCLUBIONS:

- 14. That the responsibility for the proposed DD/P urban areas work does not exist. That it would be more efficient and less are pensive to undertake the work in CIA. That the requirements be not on a reduced scale allowing experimentation and proper development of a sound product.
- 15. That this Agency undertake the establishment of an union area study capability to produce twenty studies per year rather when the current DD/P request for fifty.
- 16. That by virtue of its field of responsibility in geographic research and cartography the Geographic Area of CRR be given the added responsibility of urban area work.
- 17. That urban area work to be undertaken by this Agency be recognized as an essentially new program requiring additional personnel over and above those already assigned to the Geographic Area, CRR.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

18. That the Agency establish an Urban Area Program and familities in the Geographic Area, CRR by allocating 20 additional personnel

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slots in order that recruitment of qualified persons can be under taken immediately.

production of at least six urban studies (four are currently committed to DD/P and in production) of highest priority during the next year and upon the procurement of additional personnel to undertake the production of 20 studies per year thereafter. The plan and cost for augustation of staff is outlined in tab "E".

OFFO E. GUME Assistant Director Research and Reports

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